Administrative Law by Dick, Melissa A.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 7 
February 2021 
Administrative Law 
Melissa A. Dick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa A. Dick, Administrative Law, 69 Denv. U. L. Rev. 791 (1992). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Nearly all of the federal agency decisions reviewed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals during the last year evidenced the federal
court's tendency to give substantial defeience to administrative agency
decision-making. While favoring broad judicial review in administrative
law cases, the Tenth Circuit continued this deferential trend in 1991.
Part I of this Article discusses Tenth Circuit decisions that applied the
"substantial evidence" standard of review, the general standard for judi-
cial review of formal agency'action. Part I also discusses two cases that
applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, the highly
deferential standard for agency appeals. Part II examines the Tenth Cir-
cuit's comprehensive analysis in Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision,' which also reflects the continuing federal judicial
practice of giving substantial deference to administrative rulings. This
Article highlights the Franklin decision because the Tenth Circuit's in-
depth analysis illustrates the federal courts' approach to reviewing ad-
ministrative actions more comprehensively than any other case the court
decided in 1991.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 completely excludes re-
view of agency decisions when review is* prohibited by a particular
agency statute or when "committed to agency discretion by law."'3 How-
ever, in recent years, courts held "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should courts re-
strict access to judicial review." 4 The appropriateness ofjudicial review
of agency decision-making was thus stiongly presumed.5 The APA out-
lines specific standards a reviewing court must apply in determining
whether an agency decision is valid.6 The purpose of these standards is
to ensure "the courts do not improperly usurp the prerogatives of the
legislature" to administer the activities of agencies or take away author-
ity properly entrusted in the agency. 7 The scope of judicial review is
meant to reflect the scope of authority delegated to the particular
agency, including the extent to which it was empowered by statute to
make discretionary determinations. 8 Both the substantial evidence and
arbitrary and capricious standards of review are based upon "reasona-
1. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1988).
3. Id. § 701(a)(2).
4. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
5. JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS 132 (1989).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
7. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 580 (1986).
8. Id. at 583.
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bleness" and both require a sufficient factual basis be present in the ad-
minstrative record to support the agency's decision. 9
A. The Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
Despite the similarities in the judicial review standards, the
Supreme Court indicated the substantial evidence standard may impose
a greater burden on the reviewing court by requiring it to take a "harder
look" at the record than it would otherwise.10 In some agency statutes,
Congress has required the substantial evidence standard so courts will
engage in a more rigorous review."1 Courts use the "substantial evi-
dence" test to review agency fact finding in proceedings determined on
the basis of a formal agency record. 12 This standard "goes to the rea-
sonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the record before it,
for a decision may be supported by substantial evidence even though it
could be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to the deci-
sion-making body."' 13 The substantial evidence standard's intended
purpose is to limit an appellate court's power to overturn an agency's
fact findings. 14 The general view is that this rationality test must be
based upon the record as a whole,' 5 although originally substantial evi-
dence meant merely "more than a mere scintilla," or "such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."' 16 Thus, the substantial evidence standard is a more diffi-
9. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors, Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (since the APA's scope of review provi-
sions are cumulative, agency action supported by required substantial evidence may be, in
another regard, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful).
10. MICHAEL AsIMow & ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 625 (1989); see also American Paper Inst. Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983) (in the absence of a statutory requirement to employ a spe-
cific review standard, the court must review agency action under the more easily satisfied
arbitrary and capricious standard, which the APA requires for judicial review of informal
rulemaking).
11. BONFIELD, supra note 6, at 625.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
13. Id.
14. BONFIELD, supra note 6, at 573.
15. § 706 of the APA provides that a court shall set aside agency action "unsupported
by substantial evidence" and that "[i]n making the foregoing determinations, the court
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party." 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2) &
(2)(E) (1988).
16. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), which states that:
Even though the whole record may have been canvassed in order to determine
whether the evidentiary foundation of a determination by the Board was "sub-
stantial," the phrasing of this Court's process of review readily lent itself to the
notion that it was enough that the evidence supporting the Board's result was
"substantial" when considered by itself ... Protests against "shocking injus-
tices" and intimations of judicial "abdication" with which some courts granted
enforcement of the Board's orders stimulated pressures for legislative relief from
alleged administrative excesses.... [Thus,] Congress ... made it clear that a
reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial,
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the
body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.
Id. at 477-79, 488.
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cult one for the agency to meet than the arbitrary and capricious test.
The Tenth Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard in four
cases discussed in this Article, affirming two Immigration and Naturali-
zation Services (INS) decisions supported by substantial evidence.
However, applying the same standard, the court reversed both Health
and Human Services decisions due to the lack of supportive evidence.
1. The Immigration and Naturalization Services Decisions
Both Kapcia v. INS 17 and Rivera-Zurita v. INS 18 involved claimants
charged with deportability pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (Act).1 9 The Immigration and Naturalization Services denied the
applications for asylum and suspension of deportation in both cases and
the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Tenth Circuit held the
factual findings of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) were sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
Kapcia involved a claim by petitioners that they were eligible for asy-
lum because of past and future persecution arising from membership in
the Solidarity movement in Poland. The BIA found petitioners did not
show the fear of persecution required to merit relief nor did they satisfy
the more difficult eligibility standard required for withholding of depor-
tation to meet the burden of proof for asylum.20 The Tenth Circuit re-
viewed the BIA's factual findings as to whether an alien is a refugee
under the substantial evidence standard.2 1 The court placed signifi-
cance on the fact that this standard does not "weigh the evidence or
evaluate the witness' credibility."' 22 Even if the court disagreed with the
BIA's position, it should not reverse if the BIA's conclusions were "sub-
stantially reasonable."
'23
The BIA found petitioners ineligible for statutory asylum because
they did not meet their burden of establishing refugee status. An appli-
cant for asylum "'must present "specific facts" through objective evi-
dence to prove either past persecution or "good reason" to fear future
persecution.' ",24 Part of the BIA's reasoning was based on the fact that
political changes in Poland made persecution less likely. The BIA took
administrative notice of the changed political situation and inferred the
new government would not persecute members of Solidarity. It there-
fore found no specific facts to establish a well-founded fear of
17. 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991).
18. 946 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1988).
20. Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 703.
21. Id. at 707.
22. Id. (quoting Sorenson v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 684 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir.
1982)).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1990)). See
also Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring either specific
facts showing past persecution or evidence that they will be singled out for future
persecution).
1992]
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persecution.
2 5
In reviewing the BIA's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit agreed that
petitioners did not establish the credible, direct or specific evidence nec-
essary to establish an objectively well-founded fear.2 6 Therefore, the
court did not have to examine the petitioners' subjective fears, and
given the fact the BIA's findings were "substantially reasonable, ' '2 7 the
Tenth Circuit easily found substantial evidence in the record to support
its denial of asylum.
Rivera-Zurita involved an alien charged with deportability after find-
ing him precluded from establishing good moral character. Rivera's de-
portation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge (IJ), who
denied him relief because he found petitioner had recently spent more
than 180 days in prison. Consequently, he was statutorily ineligible for
either suspension of deportation or voluntary departure. 28 The Act
mandates an alien who seeks these forms of discretionary relief must
show "good moral character" 29 for a specified period of time.
5 0
Rivera contended the IJ and the BIA erred in finding he had spent
more than 180 days injail. Rivera alleged he testified incorrecdy during
his deportation hearing regarding his incarceration period because he
lacked understanding of the law.3 1 However, based upon Rivera's testi-
mony and the documentary evidence of record, the IJ and the BIA found
he spent more than 180 days in confinement during the time relevant to
suspension of deportation and voluntary departure.3 2 In reviewing the
BIA's decision, the Tenth Circuit found Rivera failed to meet his burden
to prove he was not incarcerated for more than 180 days. Because sub-
stantial evidence existed in the record to support the BIA's conclusion,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision.
3 3
2. The Health and Human Services Decisions
Both Hill v. Sullivan 34 and Pacheco v. Sullivan3 5 involved claimants
25. See Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 704-05.
26. Id. at 707.
27. Id.
28. Rivera-Zurita v. INS, 946 F.2d 118, 120 (10th Cir. 1991). For suspension of de-
portation, the alien must show he "has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such
application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral
character." 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988). For voluntary departure, the alien must show
he can depart at his own expense and has been "a person of good moral character for at
least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure." Id. at
§ 1254(e)(1).
29. The Act states that good moral character will not be found where a conviction
resulted in 180 days or more of confinement during the specific period when good charac-
ter is required. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0)(7) (1988).
30. The Act requires good moral character for either seven or ten years depending on
the specific deportation suspension invoked. Id. at § 1254(a).
31. 946 F.2d at 121-22.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id. at 122.
34. 924 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. 931 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1991).
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seeking review of the Department of Health and Human Services'(HHS)
denial of benefits. The Tenth Circuit applied the substantial evidence
standard to these cases as it did in the INS cases, but here the appellate
court reversed the agency's decision in both instances.
In Hill, the claimant appealed the decision of the Secretary of HHS
denying her supplemental security income benefits.8 6 Hill claimed the
Secretary's determination that she was not disabled was not supported
by substantial evidence.3 7 Hill contended the Secretary neglected to de-
velop the record fully and fairly by failing to have her possible chronic
depression evaluated.3 8 The Secretary rendered his decision "on the
ground that her impairment did not prevent her from returning to her
past relevant work and, therefore, she was not disabled." 9 The Tenth
Circuit found the Secretary failed to follow proper procedure in evaluat-
ing the claimant's potential mental impairment and reversed.
40
An administrative determination of fact made by the Secretary is to
be considered "conclusive" on judicial review if supported by substan-
tial evidence.4 ' However, if the Secretary ignores overwhelming evi-
dence to the contrary, the substantial evidence test is not met.4 2 The
Secretary argued Hill's potential mental impairment was not related to
her claim for disability and there was no duty to inquire about it.
4 3
However, the record upon which the Secretary based his opinion con-
tained evidence of a mental impairment, which allegedly prevented Hill
from working, and the Secretary should have followed procedure for
evaluating the potential medical problem.4 4 The Tenth Circuit found
the Secretary had not carefully considered all relevant evidence since the
record contained evidence of a mental impairment. Therefore, his deci-
sion was not supported by substantial evidence.
4 5
Pacheco v. Sullivan4 6 involved the termination of disability benefits
by the Secretary after finding the claimant could perform "other work in
the national economy."' 47 Pacheco complained the Secretary's finding
was not supported by substantial evidence because evidence showed
36. Hill, 924 F.2d at 973.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 974.
39. Id. at 973. The Administrative Law Judge's decision became the final decision of
the Secretary because the Appeals Council denied claimant's request for review. The dis-
trict court affirmed the Secretary's decision and this appeal followed. Id.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
42. Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1985).
43. Hill, 924 F.2d at 974.
44. Id. at 975. The court invoked § 8(a) of the Reform Act, which provided that:
An initial determination... that an individual is not under a disability, in any case
where there is evidence which indicates the existence of a mental impairment,
shall be made only if the Secretary has made every reasonable effort to ensure
that a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical portion of
the case review and any applicable residual functional capacity assessment.
42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (1988).
45. Hill, 924 F.2d at 975.
46. 931 F.2d at 695 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 697.
1992]
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Pacheco needed treatment to render him able to work in the future.48
Pacheco's physician evaluated his injuries and determined he required
knee surgery before he could perform any work, but the Secretary failed
to consider his determination.
4 9
The Tenth Circuit discussed four requirements that must be met
before a claimant's failure to undergo treatment may terminate his bene-
fits5 ° and determined the Secretary had not made a finding with respect
to any of them.5 1 By not applying the correct legal standards, the Secre-
tary's finding that Pacheco was not disabled could not have been based
on substantial evidence, and was therefore improper. 52 Remanding the
case to the Secretary, the court emphasized the fact it did "not mean to
preclude the Secretary from acting in his proper role as factfinder."
5 3
But the court recognized that, even without additional evidence to de-
termine whether Pacheco unjustifiably refused treatment, the physician's
report contained substantial evidence to support a finding Pacheco was
disabled.
54
B. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard allows a court to set aside
an agency action only if it is "so far outside the range of action expected
from responsible decision makers that it cannot successfully be de-
fended as an exercise of reasoned judgment."5 5 The standard is highly
deferential to the agency. Thus, only if the agency acted irrationally or
illogically may the court set aside its decision.5 6 The arbitrary and capri-
cious provision is a "catch-all" standard under which administrative mis-
conduct is reviewed if it is not covered by the other more specific
standards.5 7 To find a decision arbitrary and capricious, the court must
consider whether the decision was based upon all relevant factors and
decide whether the agency made a clear error ofjudgment. 58 The ulti-
mate standard of review is a narrow one, however, and the court may
48. Id. at 696-97.
49. Id. at 697.
50. The court stated that "'(1) the treatment must be expected to restore the claim-
ant's ability to work; (2) the treatment must have been prescribed; (3) the treatment must
have been refused; (4) the refusal must have been without justifiable excuse.' "Id. at 697-
98 (quoting Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 1985)).




55. BONFIELD, supra note 6, at 575.
56. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 258 (1991).
57. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
The Supreme Court has defined "substantial inquiry" as whether the Secretary acted
within his authority, whether the decision was within the range of available choices, and
whether the decision that there were no feasible alternatives was reasonable. The review-
ing court must find the agency choice was not capricious, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise unlawful. Id. at 413-16.
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not substitute its judgment for the agency's.5 9
1. Sierra Club v. Lujan
Sierra Club v. Lujan60 involved an action brought against the Depart-
ment of Interior to enjoin a proposed road improvement project that
passed through federal lands bordering a wilderness study area in
southern Utah.6 1 In an earlier appeal, 62 the Tenth Circuit determined
there was a "major federal action" and remanded the case to the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) for an environmental assessment. 63 Based
on BLM's findings of no significant impact, the district court lifted its
injunction against construction on the areas bordering the wilderness
study area on the western twenty-eight miles of Burr Trail. The Sierra
Club again appealed. 64
On the second appeal, the court narrowed its focus to the factual
matters "derived from the limited scope of the BLM action." 6 5 It re-
viewed only those matters challenged in the district court regarding the
"Harper Contract," an agreement to improve the western twenty-eight
miles of Burr Trail from a one-lane dirt road to a two-lane gravel road.
66
BLM was required to consider the environmental impacts and unavoida-
ble adverse effects associated with this project, and either issue a finding
of no significant impact, or issue an environmental impact statement
(EIS).67 After careful review of the impacts of the proposed project, the
BLM determined there was no significant impact. An EIS was therefore
unnecessary.
The court applied the arbitrary and capricious test as handed down
by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council.68 In
adopting this test and rejecting the "reasonableness" standard, Sierra
Club followed the trend set by other circuits. 6 9 After examining the rec-
ord, the Tenth Circuit was satisfied the agency took a "hard look" at the
environmental impacts the proposed contract would have on the wilder-
59. Id. at 416.
60. 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 364.
62. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988) (although BLM's actions
regarding the county's road construction proposal neither exceeded its right-of-way
through public lands nor constituted a "major federal action" within the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, BLM's duty to prevent unnecessary degradation of adjoining wilderness
study areas under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act did constitute a "major
federal action".
63. 949 F.2d at 364.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 367.
66. Id. at 364.
67. Id.
68. 490 U.S. 360 (1989). The court invoked the arbitrary and capricious scope of
review pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
69. See Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1990) (court
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency's decision not to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement); see also North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903
F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard is
appropriate when appellate court reviews agency action under the National Environmental
Policy Act).
1992]
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ness study area, and thus determined the decision to forego an EIS was
not arbitrary and capricious.
70
2. Rives v. Interstate Commerce Commission
Rives7 l concerned employees of railroad subsidiaries affected by
consolidation, who sought review of an Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) decision, which denied them labor protective conditions
under the Interstate Commerce Act. The petitioners claimed the ICC
erred in determining they were not entitled to labor protection. 72 The
Tenth Circuit held the enabling statute was silent on the issue. Thus,
since ICC's decision denying the employees labor protection was not
arbitrary and capricious, it was not subject to judicial review.
73
The ICC imposed labor protective conditions to protect those rail-
road employees affected by consolidation. 74 Petitioners who were ter-
minated after consolidation were denied benefits, because under the
ICC's interpretation of the statute, they were not railroad employees.
75
The ICC construed the statute as applying only to employees the rail
carrier directly employed, so petitioners employed by non-rail subsidiar-
ies were excluded.
76
The Tenth Circuit applied the "two-step" analysis employed by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 7 7 Applying the first step in the analysis, the Court determined Con-
gress had not "unambiguously expressed an intent that employees of a
motor carrier subsidiary [were] entitled to the mandatory protections
afforded in § 11347. '78 Since Congress had not specifically defined
"employee," the court administered the second prong of the Chevron
70. Sierra Club, 949 F.2d at 369.
71. Rives v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 934 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 1172.
73. Id. at 1174.
74. Id. at 1173. These conditions included such benefits as dismissal or dismissal al-
lowances and continuation of benefits for a specific time period. Id. at 1173 n. 1.
75. The statute governing labor protective conditions states:
When a rail carrier is involved in a transaction for which approval is sought under
sections 11344 and 11345 or section 11346 of this title, the Interstate Commerce
Commission shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement at least as
protective of the interest of employees who are affected by the transaction as the
terms imposed under this section before February 5, 1976, and the terms estab-
lished under section 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 565).
49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1988).
76. Rives, 934 F.2d at 1173-74.
77. Id at 1174. The court held that:
First, if Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue and its intent
is clear, 'that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.' If Congress has
not addressed directly the precise question at issue, the reviewing court 'does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute .... Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.'
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (citations omitted)).
78. Id. at 1174.
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test to determine whether the ICC's interpretation of § 11347 was per-
missible. 79 The eourt found, despite the possibility of a more reason-
able interpretation of the statute, it must uphold the agency's
interpretation so long as it was reasonable or permissible. Bound by
this standard, the Tenth Circuit declined disturbing it on review.
80
II. SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY ACTION: FRANKLIN SA. Ass'N
v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision,8 1 an exhaustive analysis of the applicable law, reflects
the judicial practice of giving substantial deference to administrative
agency rulings. In Franklin, the Tenth Circuit provides a comprehensive
discussion of the standards for judicial review of administrative actions
as well as a model approach to appeals of federal agency decisions.
A. Facts
Franklin operated as a traditional savings and loan association for
approximately eighty years before it was acquired by new ownership in
1973.82 The new ownership group brought marked changes to Franklin
by expanding services to include eight branches and adopting novel
marketing strategies and pursuits. 83 Franklin's asset base changed as it
had acquired numerous forms of mortgage backed securities.8 4 Ulti-
mately, mortgage backed securities and junk bonds made up more than
thirty-five percent of Franklin's assets. 85 While Franklin's earnings and
working capital declined, it continued aggressive expansion without a
corresponding growth in capital.
8 6
The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision had several con-
cerns about Franklin's capital structure. The Director expressed his
concerns by telling Franklin the savings association's net interest margin
had been decreasing, and was actually negative for the past three
quarters. 87 However, Franklin failed to comply with repeated agency
directives to remedy its financial situation. On February 15, 1990, the
Director determined Franklin's condition was too unsafe and unsound
to transact business and appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation as
conservator.
8 8
79. Id. at 1174-75.
80. Id. at 1175-76.
81. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1133.
83. Id.
84. A mortgage backed security is a security that entitles the holder to share in the
payments (cash flow) from a fixed pool of mortgage loans. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1134.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1135.
1992]
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B. District Court Proceedings
The district court initially established its jurisdiction by noting that
Congress specifically provided for judicial review of a regulator's ap-
pointment of a conservator in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).8 9 However, the court also
noted the FIRREA provision that allows judicial review of the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) neglects to define the scope or standard of
review. 90
The court outlined in detail the appropriate standard of review for
an administrative agency's action. It consulted the APA, which provides
that if the agency action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," it must be set aside.9 1
This standard entitles the agency's decision to a presumption of validity,
and the party challenging the agency action must show the agency deci-
sion lacked any basis in fact or law, or was arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
9 2
The district court then discussed the Director's contention that the
administrative agency limited its review and concluded evidence outside
the record could be properly considered. It based its finding on the
conclusion that an "on the merits" review should provide Franklin with
the opportunity to submit evidence outside the administrative record in
support of its case.9 3 The court differentiated its "hybrid standard of
review" 94 from a de novo review, and determined an examination
89. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.s.C
§§ 1461-1470 (1988). The relevant portion of FIRREA specifically states:
The Director shall have exclusive power and jurisdiction to appoint a conservator
or receiver for a Federal savings association. If, in the opinion of the Director, a
ground for the appointment of conservator or receiver for a savings association
exists, the Director is authorized to appoint ex parte and without notice a conser-
vator or receiver for the savings association. In the event of such appointment,
the association may, within 30 days thereafter, bring action in the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the home office of such association
is located ... for an order requiring the Director to remove such conservator or
receiver, and the court shall upon the merits dismiss such action or direct the
Director to remove such conservator or receiver.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1991). See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office
of Thrift Supervision, 742 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd and vacated, 934 F.2d
1127 (10th Cir. 1990).
90. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1095. The court mentioned that appropriate relief
should be granted "upon the merits," but also noted that such language concerns the scope
of reviewable evidence rather than the standard of review. Id. at 1095 n.3 (emphasis added).
91. Id at 1095 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)).
92. Id. at 1096.
93. Id. at 1096-97.
94. The hybrid standard of review was first discussed in Collie v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1150-52 (N.D. I1. 1986). The Collie court determined that
the "upon the merits" language allowed the court to continue to apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, but that the record on which such review was to be based
was expanded:
'Upon the merits' contrasts with the more usual 'on the record.' Congress must
not have intended for judicial review always to be confined to an administrative
record.... [T]he challenging association should have the opportunity to submit
evidence whether or not that evidence was considered by the Board, and to de-
velop any facts bearing on the question of whether any of the statutory grounds
[Vol. 69:4
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"upon the merits" allowed the court to expand the record on which its
review was based.9 5
After reviewing the administrative record and the evidence
presented to it by both Franklin and the Director, the district court ac-
cepted and considered evidence outside the administrative record.
96
The court found the regulator acted wrongly in imposing conservator-
ship and the Director lacked any factual basis to justify the appointment
of Resolution Trust.97 The court determined the Director acted "arbi-
trarily and capriciously" in making the appointment and ordered the Di-
rector to remove the conservator.9" Director appealed and the Tenth
Circuit stayed the order of removal pending appeal.
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit engaged in a detailed review of the applicable
statutes, legislative history and case law concerning the review of admin-
istrative agency decisions by the federal courts. The court first defined
the proper scope of review for a reviewing court when it examined a
director's decision to appoint a conservator for a savings and loan asso-
ciation.9 9 It concluded the plain language of FIRREA, while authorizing
judicial review of the Director's decision, failed to delineate the scope of
review. 100
The court noted a reviewing court may examine information
outside of the administrative record for limited purposes only. 10 More-
over, in cases where Congress provided for judicial review without set-
ting forth the necessary standards or procedures, the Supreme Court
has ruled such review should be confined to the administrative rec-
ord. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit found the lower court erred in adopting the
reasoning set forth in Collie v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and rejected
the district court's application of a hybrid scope of review.10 3 Although
the Tenth Circuit did not place strict limitations on the admission of
evidence by the reviewing court, it noted the district court made exten-
sive, independent findings. The court concluded the reviewing court
existed. 'Upon the merits' means that both parties to the reviewing action have
the right to develop the judicial record.
Id. at 1151 (citations omitted).
95. See 742 F. Supp. at 1097.
96. Id. at 1099.
97. Id. at 1126-27.
98. Id. at 1126.
99. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1136-40.
100. Id. at 1137.
101. Id. An example of such a limited purpose would be: where the administrative
record fails to disclose the factors used by the agency, a reviewing court may require addi-
tional findings or testimony from agency officials to determine if the action was justified.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
102. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1137. Accord Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); United States v. Carlo Bianchi
& Co., Inc., 373 U.S. 709 (1963); Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1986).
103. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1138.
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should confine its review to the information available to the Director at
the time the appointment decision was made.'
0 4
The Tenth Circuit also held the appropriate standard of review
specified in the APA should be applied in this situation. The APA pro-
vides that an appointment decision may be set aside only if found arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with the law.10 5 Although the district court articulated the correct stan-
dard, the Tenth Circuit concluded the lower court misapplied it.106 The
Tenth Circuit then noted the reviewing court must defer to the Director
where a reasonable person considering the matter, as presented to the
agency, could find a rational basis to arrive at the same judgment made
by the Director. 107 The Tenth Circuit determined the district court was
not justified in fact-finding to test the Director's decision to appoint a
conservator10s It found the Director's decision supported by substan-
tial evidence, not arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.10 9
The Tenth Circuit thus reversed and vacated the decision of the district
court, remanding it with instructions to dismiss the action. 110
D. Analysis
A court reviewing an agency action is sometimes compared to an
appellate court reviewing trial court findings; because the appellate
court is distanced from the entire trial process, the trial court's decision
should be given deference. Agency decisions are, however, different
from trial court decisions. The reasoning and expertise behind agency
decisions are apt to be even less familiar to a reviewing trial court than
trial court decisions are to appellate courts. "' Thus, reviewing courts
give more deference to agency decisions than to trial court decisions.
Also, agency policy choices are traditionally afforded considerable defer-
ence; they are generally approved if they have a "reasonable basis in the
law." The reasoning behind this policy is the expertise of the agency is
foreign to the courts and should therefore be afforded some
deference. "1
2
104. Id. at 1140.
105. Id. at 1142.
106. Id. The court of appeals found that the lower court had actually conducted a de
novo review. Id.
107. Id. Employing language used in Webb v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252 (10th Cir. 1989),
the court constructed a standard for appellate review of district court review of agency
actions. The appellate court must review the agency decision independently, based on the
same administrative record the district court utilized. The same review standard is used at
both levels. On appeal, the district court decision is afforded no particular deference. Id.
108. The Tenth Circuit felt that, by allowing Franklin's experts to testify, the lower
court both expanded the scope of review and improperly applied the standard of review.
The lower court thus overstepped its boundaries. Id. at 1150-51.
109. Id. at 1151.
110. Id.
111. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF BUREAUCRACY 32-33 (1990).
112. Id. at 33-34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)
(holding that an agency's initial determination of a statutory term must be accepted if it is
warranted in the record and has a reasonable basis in applicable law); Gray v. Powell, 314
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While the general consensus is agency decisions are to be afforded
considerable deference, there is still the problem of how much defer-
ence. This concerns the question of the scope of judicial review-the
evidence the reviewing court will analyze in examining the agency deci-
sion. As the Tenth Circuit discussed, in order to define the proper
scope of review in Franklin it became necessary to examine whether Con-
gress had established or defined a scope of review to be used when re-
viewing appointment decisions. 113 The court found it significant that
Congress passed FIRREA in response to the problems existing within
the savings and loan industry and, consequently, FIRREA "dictate[d]
strong and prompt supervisory oversight." 114 The Tenth Circuit ana-
lyzed the plain language of the statute that gave the director his broad
regulatory and enforcement powers. 15 The court's analysis focused on
the words "opinion" and "on the merits". The Tenth Circuit stressed
the determination of whether the director appointed a conservator was
based on the Director's opinion.' 16 Congress designed the statute so
the Director could immediately appoint a conservator. 117 The court
also noted the "upon the merits" language of the statute providing for
judicial review of the Director's decision did not authorize the lower
court to construct an entirely new record. 18 The Fifth 119 and Eighth 120
Circuits have agreed judicial review under this statute is limited to the
administrative record, not to a new one compiled by the district court.
Besides determining the scope ofjudicial review, the Tenth Circuit
also deliberated upon the correct standard of review. The court found
the district court articulated the correct standard, 121 but applied it in-
correctly. The rest of the court's analysis focused on the trial court's
mistaken application of a de novo review. 122 The district court lacked
authorization to make independent, de novo, findings of fact, and
should instead have determined whether any rational basis existed upon
which the Director could have based his decision. Because the district
court inappropriately expanded the record, the Tenth Circuit was not
subject to the usual, deferential fact standard of the factual findings of a
district court.
In reviewing the determination to appoint a conservator under the
U.S. 402, 412-13 (1941) (stating that a determination left to an agency will remain un-
touched by a reviewing court).
113. See Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1136.
114. Id.
115. For the pertinent portion of FIRREA, see supra note 87.
116. 934 F.2d at 1137. "Congress did not mandate a haring or specific findings of fact
be made; rather it required only the director be of the opinion statutory grounds for ap-
pointment of a conservator existed." Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1140.
119. See, e.g., Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
120. See, e.g., Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d
1339 (8th Cir. 1986).
121. The district court used the arbitrary and capricious test as specified in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1988).
122. 934 F.2d at 1142.
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arbitrary and capricious standard, a reviewing court is limited to a con-
sideration of the administrative record before the Director when the de-
cision was made. 123 A reviewing court may go outside of the
administrative record for limited purposes only. For example, evidence
may be admitted when necessary to explain the action of the agency.
124
Where the administrative record does not disclose the factors consid-
ered by the Director, a reviewing court may require the Director to pre-
pare additional findings, or, if necessary, require testimony from agency
officials to explain the decision. 12 5 Judicial review should thus remain
limited to the administrative record already in existence, "not some new
record made initially in the reviewing court."'
26
Some of the evidence introduced at trial may have been properly
admitted to explain technical terms. However, the lower court used
most of the evidence to make its own determinations about the safety of
Franklin's operations. 12 7 The inquiry of the district court went beyond
any authorized scope of review, which resulted in the court substituting
its own judgment for the Director's. The court thus violated the princi-
ples that "[t]he reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a
de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own con-
clusions"' 28 and that courts are not free to substitute their views for
those of the appropriate government agency.
12 9
E. Conclusion
Congress made it clear that it vested the Director with the responsi-
bility to determine the soundness of a financial institution.13 0 The
Tenth Circuit correctly determined the Director's judgment should not
be subject to the strict scrutiny re-examination the district court applied.
The sole question determined during judicial review should have been
the question the Tenth Circuit considered-whether the Director rea-
sonably determined a ground existed for the appointment of a conserva-
tor. After reviewing only the agency record, the Tenth Circuit
concluded the Director determined a reasonable ground existed for the
conservator's appointment.
CONCLUSION
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit continued its trend to give
substantial deference to administrative agency decisions. The court
carefully scrutinized agency decision-making, but overruled agency deci-
sions only when convinced the agency definitely failed to consider all
123. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). See also supra note 105 and accompa-
nying text.
124. Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
126. 411 U.S. at 142.
127. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1142-45.
128. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
129. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
130. See Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1151.
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relevant evidence. The Franklin decision exemplifies the Tenth Circuit's
meticulous consideration of the agency record and its general tendency
to defer to agency expertise when reviewing administrative actions.
Melissa A. Dick

